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1The Role of Space in the Security and Defence Policy of Turkey
A Change in Outlook: Security in Space versus Security from Space 
Abstract 
Space and security domains are strongly related with each other. Nowadays, space is an 
indispensable part of security and defence policy, and it is increasingly becoming a critical 
infrastructure for strategic Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. However, space is vulnerable itself to the 
new space threats. This study reviews the current and near future space role in Turkey’s 
security and defence policy and aims to address the threats against space based capabilities. 
To provide security from space, space based systems shall themselves need to be secure in 
space to warrant the security. The concept of security from space starts with space security, in 
other words the security in space. This paper also highlights the emerging technological 
opportunities for these space threats to be secure in space in order to provide the security from 
space. According to the relevant taxonomy, a categorized opportunity proposal for more robust 
and resilient space/satellite projects’ architecture is proposed for Turkey. 
1. Introduction
Space technology, including satellites, is a proficient tool for both governments but sadly 
for terrorist organizations too in different perspectives. Governments have used technology to 
try and prevent terrorism and to ensure security, while terrorist-organizations take advantage of 
space to act freely. In this study, the potential threats against Space Based Applications (SBA) 
are categorized with their sources and their technological solutions are addressed mostly for 
defence space missions. Though most of the solutions are also valid for the commercial space 
segment, they are beyond of the scope of this study and will not be looked at in this paper.
Today’s applicable threats and potential risks to missions from space have recently 
changed a lot in every aspect. Hence, the policy of security and defence needs to be reshaped 
accordingly. New forms of modern technology should also be applied wisely to mitigate and stop 
these threats. At this point, security applications based in space have many versatile capabilities 
to support real-time security and defence requirements. 
Colarik [1] advises initially to understand the way of terrorist organizations before trying 
to be prevented from them. Real-time information supplied by recent space technologies is one 
of the most important pillars of their effective attacks. “Through utilization of the global 
information infrastructure and its underlying technologies, terrorists can operate in a virtual 
electronic world that provides them with numerous advantages for communication and 
coordination efforts, as well as assisting in their ongoing development and expansion efforts” 
[1].
SBA can be an ideal candidate for these important security needs and broader defence 
concepts. The reason for this continually increased demand for SBA is explained by Evans [2] 
as “partly to increased communication requirements in the face of enemy threats and partly due 
to increasingly sophisticated end-user requirements”. For the time sensitive requirements, 
space originated data can contribute to ensure security. This paper explains both the role of 
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security in space is the first and utmost important step of providing security from space.
2. The Vital Need for Space for Improved Security and Defence Policy: Security from 
Space
Today, we live in a new space era and space is becoming more competitive and useful 
than ever before. Effective and efficient use of space and satellites is a power and a force 
multiplier for governments [3]. It is therefore clear that a proactive method, instead of old 
outdated approaches, will help to provide better and wider security, especially after the spread 
of global terrorism. 
Fighting against terrorism is just one of the crucial rapid-response service dependents of 
the space sector. In this context, global space dependencies are detailed by NATO in [4] under 
following main five headings: 
1. Positioning, Timing, Navigation (PTN) and Velocity
2. Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
3. Integrated Tactical Warning and Threat Assessment
4. Satellite Communications (SATCOM)
5. Environmental Monitoring. 
Precise and real-time confirmed information to decision makers/fighters on the field, 
whenever and wherever needed, provides an important information superiority and integrity 
capability in their security and defence strategy. It is generally believed that more Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems technology leads to information superiority [5]. Space can offer short notice high 
capacity services to anywhere at any time on Earth. To meet the required operational 
expectations for security and defence, finite SBA resources are required to gain the benefits of 
today’s space technology.   
Likely for NATO, in-orbit SBA are invaluable tools for Turkey’s security and defence 
strategies too. Missile defence systems, satellite communication, and meteorological data 
provided from space are desperately needed by the decision makers to be able to see the 
risks/vulnerabilities and to predict the following stages of defence and security. Furthermore, 
PTN and ISR capabilities are required by staff to be aware of ongoing situation, organize the 
operational environment, foresee the future developments and propose to act harmoniously. 
SBA are indispensable tool not only before and during but also even after the missions 
for the security and defence organizations. ISR data, mostly offered by reconnaissance 
satellites, is used in the decision process and served both to the fighters and to the 
commanders in near-real-time through Satellite Communications (SATCOM). For the planning 
of units, their deployment, tracking the blue force movements safely; precision and timely 
navigation, weather and ISR data of the Area of Responsibility (AOR) must be supplied to the 
commanders, staffs and the operation planners in a timely manner. The continuity and the 
sustainability of these time sensitive data updates are crucial because the gathering, enabling, 
employing, updating and serving process of these space originated weather, enemy and 
battlefield data continue simultaneously until the last minute of the mission and even after the 
operation. During the damage assessments or rescue operations, ISR data with infrared images 
from the AOR are helpful while locations are transmitted to the control stations almost instantly 
by Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) rescue signals in emergency situations.
At the same time, early warning for missile defences supports to active and passive 
missile defence for operational forces in the AOR and Area of Interest (AOI). SATCOM provides 
Command and Control (C2) of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) at Beyond Line of Sight 
(BLOS), communication on the move with the deployed and mobile forces and assets, and 
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move offered by communication satellites and real-time useful secure information sharing 
provided by space based ISR assets give great advantage for defence and security 
organizations.  
PTN will also be another critical asset during the whole mission. GNSS signals are 
widely used for positioning and navigation throughout operations. Additionally, synchronization 
of C4ISR systems as well as strategic defence missile systems use GNSS timing information. 
On the other hand, using GNSS satellites is required but not enough for time sensitive 
operations. Kaplan and Hegarty [6] discussed  that “a single SPS GPS user can often attain 
better than 10m, 95% positioning and 20-ns, 95% timing accuracy worldwide. There are many 
applications, however, that demand levels of accuracy, integrity, availability, and continuity 
beyond even what a GPS PPS receiver can deliver.” Continuously real-time updated data 
through GNSS, missile defence, ISR, and communication satellites is one of the most critical 
and important inputs for the decision makers, commanders, staffs, analysers and the fighters 
during all of the mission stages.   
The combination of space based C4ISR assets and airborne assets is one of the 
requirements for commanders’ critical information requirements and successful intelligence 
assessments. During all phases, most of the gathered and processed information is 
disseminated via SATCOM to wherever it is needed. Moreover, time-sensitive reports and 
orders are securely transferred through secure satellite links provided by hardened space 
segments. 
On the other hand, meteorological data is another important input for scheduling 
SATCOM. Furthermore, it is critical to decide the most appropriate kind of space assets, such 
as planning either SAR satellite or EO satellite; as the former is not restricted by clouds. Space 
based ISR assets support to find and fix the adversaries’ actions, their communication networks 
and their intention. They also provide the enemy’s space based capability vulnerabilities in the 
context of AOR, AOI, space situational awareness (SSA) and sensitive infrastructures. Besides, 
borders are also monitored by space related capabilities. Space based assets provide not only 
mission critical security data for fighters but also situational awareness information for their own 
security in their orbits in space.
Friendly (blue) force tracking systems use GNSS data and SATCOM to transmit their 
own positions and receiving blue force positions for the situational awareness. The SBA’s 
support in crisis continues through all stages of the operations. GNSS systems are also a tool 
for identifying the location of the enemy’s jammer(s) and suggesting an alternative way for 
navigation as well as being vital for targeting.
Space derived data may be critical in re-evaluating the situations, re-configuring the 
plans and allocating of the units’ resources, reserves and systems in near-real-time. For 
instance, under any jamming conditions that cannot be mitigated, non-GNSS guided systems 
may be an alternative to be considered. Likewise, under jamming conditions; more resilient EHF 
Band, STANAG 4606 Ed.3 X Band frequency hopping modems with tactical SATCOM 
terminals, other frequency band SATCOM terminals or narrowband UHF terminals may be 
alternatives for secure and robust communications. 
As discussed above, growing numbers of security operations rely on space. The position 
in Turkey’s Security and Defence Policy is not an exception. Dede and Akçay [7] depict Turkey’s 
increasing space programmes in their study. The number of big space projects including low, 
medium and geostationary satellites [7] proves Turkey’s dependencies on space for security 
and defence needs. Since 1996 when the first Türksat 1B satellite was launched, Turkey’s PTN, 
C4ISR, SATCOM and monitoring assets have increasingly become more dependent on 
satellites. Turkey’s satellite project roadmap (figure-3.11 in [8]) also accentuates the necessity 
of securing Turkey’s SBA in space. 
43. Turkish Space Programme Capabilities
Space-borne data from the satellites has been an essential and indispensable part of the 
security and defence cycle. Data for weather, command and control, communications, position 
navigation and timing, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, mapping, and early 
warning are mostly served by and through space based assets [4][9]. However, the increasing 
reliance on space is also turning to vulnerability. Having many SBA to provide security from 
space is not sufficient. To secure the space-originated data, satellites and space-based 
applications shall themselves need to be safe at first. 
Now, broadened SBA is not a choice but it is a must for most governments in order to be 
able to consider and maintain global security and defence. As the kind of threats have 
dramatically changed recently, re-thinking the conceptual methods in attempt to keep pace with 
them, todays available space technology is an urgent and inevitable necessity for global 
security.
As mentioned earlier, like many other countries, Turkey is heavily reliant on space for its 
security and defence requirements. Space related technology has taken its place in the Turkey’s 
strategic agenda for the last 40 years to be a regional player in the space arena [10–13]. For the 
past 10 years, Turkey’s national space programs were accelerated at a remarkable pace. At 
present, Turkey is [13–15]: 
- One of the 30 countries who have and operate their own LEO and GEO satellite/s in 
orbit/s,
- One of the seven NATO nations who have their own military X Band SATCOM payloads, 
- The only other country, after France, that has developed national STANAG 4606 
compatible X Band frequency hopping SATCOM modems, 
- One of the two NATO countries who have successfully initiated and completed 
processed EHF R&D project,
- One of the several countries who have their own class 100,000 Assembly, Integration 
and Test (AIT) centre.
Satellite systems mainly have three orbits which have their own unique purpose with their 
specific advantage over the other one [16]: Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), 
and Geostationary/geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). LEO satellites are generally used for 
earth observation and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. In this 
respect for dual use, Turkey has the Bilsat, Rasat, Göktürk-1, Göktürk-2 and Göktürk-3 satellite 
projects [17–20]. For Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), MEO satellites are generally 
used for positioning and navigation purposes. Turkey has a Regional Positioning and Timing 
System (RPTS) Satellites project [21] and TUSAGA-Aktif project [22] as its augmentation 
system. Lastly, communication satellites commonly serve in GEO orbits in which the speed of 
the satellites is the same as that of the earth. Turkey has the Türksat 3A, 4A and 4B satellites in 
their orbits and has been developing its own intrinsic communication satellite (Türksat 6A) which 
is planned for launch in 2019 [23]. Turkey’s Space Launch System Project is in its second 
phase and was been started in 2013 [24]. Turkey has many ongoing space related R&D 
projects for its operational requirements. Table-1 reflects the importance of space for Turkey in 
the context of security and defence policy. 
5Table-1: Turkey’s Major Space Projects [17–27]
Orbit / Purpose Turkey’s Major Satellite/Space Projects
LEO Satellites /
Earth Observation, Remote Sensing, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance




Regional Positioning and Timing System 
Satellites 
GEO Satellites / Communication Türksat 3A, 4A, 4B and 6A 
Space Launch Systems Space Launch System Project
Augmentation Systems / 
GNSS Augmentation TUSAGA-Aktif 
With the latest space and satellite technology achievements, Security and Defence 
Policy (SDP) cannot be effectively managed without space and satellite sourced data, 
information, systems, and services. Today Turkey’s SDP, like many other developing and 
developed countries, is heavily dependent on space as highlighted in Table-1. Without SBA, the 
following actions cannot be accomplished easily in all AOR:
• Near-real-time C4ISR information is not viable and available to users wherever and 
whenever needed.
• The end users might have objection on the authentication of the provided 
information, questioning its integrity and reliability.
• The whole AOR cannot be observable and globally reachable.
• C4ISR cannot be provided if alternative terrestrial links are poor or missing.
• Setting up, initializing, operating and reconfiguration of the C4ISR will be time 
consuming which is very important factor in the AOR.
• Operational plans are done in a blind as a bat fashion.
• The continuous navigation and communication for the deployed, transportable and 
mobile headquarters/units will not be timely and correctly supportable.
• Identification friend or foe cannot not be achievable and the distinguishing them may 
be difficult to determine.
• Movements and logistics of friendly units cannot be effectively planned and tracked.
• Situational awareness including the neutral or foe units’ movements cannot be 
accomplished.
• There will be a significant gap in the generating and understanding of a Common 
Operational Picture (COP).
• GNSS guided modern weapons and warning systems will not be controllable and 
manageable.
• After operations, battle damage assessment may not be provided.
•    UAVs cannot be operational at BLOS.
•    LEO and MEO satellites cannot be steerable at BLOS.
Therefore, space based security must be provided by a secured SBA to guarantee 
safety, integrity and operational success.
4. Space Threats that Turkey Needs to Take Into Account 
There are many SBA for civilian and defence purposes through space based assets. 
Utilization of space for defence and security purposes is globally broadened and accelerated. It 
is reported in [28] that “Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely, is becoming 
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.” Nevertheless, since satellites broadcast 
6over a vast area within their huge coverage maps, a signal from space make C4ISR systems 
more prone to threats from security point of view.    
 Satellites experience many threats in or from space, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. At the conceptual level, threats create risks, and risks generate the 
vulnerabilities of the SBA. Threat is described  as “a potential violation of security” ([29] referred 
by [30]) while vulnerability is described as “weakness in an information system, cryptographic 
system, or components that could be exploited to violate system security policy and result in a 
security breach” [31]. The terms “risk” and “threat” are usually misused. Risk is commonly and 
wrongly referred to as threat. National Information Assurance glossary  [32] defines the former 
as “possibility that a particular threat will adversely impact an information system by exploiting a 
particular vulnerability” and the difference between these two terms are formulated as 
“Threat=Capability×Intend” and “Risk=Probability×Harm”. This study mainly focuses on the 
threats excluding risks and risk assessment. 
Threat sources can be man-made (generally termed threats), natural (generally called 
hazards) or caused by other factors. Although there is no common taxonomy of the threats to 
space [2], [30], [33-35], these threats are categorized and depicted as shown in Table-2.  
7Table-2: Threat Sources [2], [30], [33], [34], [35]




Unique to each segment Common for 3 segments Unintentional
Natural Hazards Other Factors
• Orbital threats
- Space debris
- Near Earth objects
Space Segment
• Physical/Nuclear attacks on 
space segment
- Laser weapons, Laser 
blinding
- Guided munitions      
- Deployed munitions
- Contamination
- High energy attack
- HANE (High Attitude Nuclear 
Explosions), Exo-atmospheric 
nuclear burst















• Late or tainted 
delivery














- Coronal Mass 
Ejection
Communication 










• Physical Attack on control 
stations and launch facilities
• Takeover, Distruption, 
Destruction
• Changing  the environment 
on purpose
• Electronic Attacks (RF)
- RF weapons
- Jammers (interference, 
uplink and downlink 
jammers)
- High energy RF damage 
systems
- Burnout
• Cyber Attacks (non RF)
- Signal Interception, 
conversion, detection 
(direction findings, user 
location, traffic analysis, 
mission tipoffs)










- Supply chain infiltration
• Kinetic energy weapons
• Interference
(unintentionally)
• Late or tainted 
delivery
• Launch failures











- Coronal Mass 
Ejection









• National priorities 
and caveats









8In generally, satellite systems consist of three segments [36]: The space segment, 
communication link, and the ground segment (including users and launchers). In this study, 
space threats were considered for all parts of the system including the ground segment, space 
segment, communication link and the launching site. In Table-2, threats against each of these 
segments were categorized according to their applicable targets. Threat sources were also 
classified according to their origins that can be either man-made, natural, or arisen from other 
reasons for each applicable segment. As seen from the Table-2, there are many both intentional 
and unintentional space threats that must be considered in costly space/satellite projects. 
Today, we witness numerous threats and vulnerability examples globally. Hreha et al 
[37] provide evidence for sufficient real jammed examples of satellite communications to justify 
the evidence. Kendall [38] boasts that “there is a growing concern that threats against vital 
space capabilities may increase during the next decade as a result of both natural and man-
made hazards and the possible development of disruptive and destructive counter-space 
capabilities”. It is most likely that intentional threats and damage to satellites may be a reason 
for a wars in future.
Readers are referred to [39–43] for further threat news. The worst debris problem exists 
in LEO orbit. The Turkish Air Force had to make Göktürk-2’s third collision avoidance 
manoeuvre on 27 April 2016 because of space debris caused by China’s Fengyun-1C DEB[44]. 
Space-borne systems are increasingly subject to the aforementioned man-made threats 
on a daily basis, which require additional countermeasures. Moreover, a space natural 
environment is in itself a hazard for satellites. SBA are becoming more and more vulnerable to 
these hazards and threats. As today’s threats are very different from the past, it is for sure that 
the threats against space will exist, and the threats and their countermeasures in the future will 
be different from today’s. It must be kept in the mind that these measures will add both design 
complexity and cost, and may decrease the communication throughput availability. The 
following section describes possible ways of securing the SBA which are also valid for Turkey.
5. Technological Opportunities for Space Threats
In the 21st century, more nations realized that satellites are the key enabler systems for 
their security and defence policies. Vulnerabilities in space, due to aforementioned threats, may 
have detrimental effects on these two important areas. Their uniqueness of providing huge 
coverage areas make satellites an indispensable part of communication and information 
systems. However, unfortunately, this is also a disadvantage for satellites since their links are 
visible and trackable from all around the world and the earth’s surface, and can be subjected to 
threats easily.   
It is necessary for defence/military satellites to provide services and to continue to 
communicate 24/7 under threats. Solin [45] discusses the LEO satellite vulnerabilities and 
warns that “…one 20 kT nuclear weapon exploded at the right altitude above the Earth, would 
cause all unhardened LEO satellites to die in hours, days, or weeks. Less appreciated is that 
LOS X-rays and neutrons from a high-altitude nuclear burst, can also damage or upset 
unhardened GEO satellites” [45]. 
Therefore, security in space is seen as a vital necessity, especially for defence/military 
satellites. The previous sections in this paper covered the current threats to space. There are 
many emerging techniques to secure the SBA from these threats. Since the protection 
measures are very costly, protection levels are set according to the user requirements. Although 
the space segment is the main focus of this paper, the entire infrastructure including the space 
segment, ground segment, communication link and launch facility are taken into account too. 
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services and requires them to withstand the threats in all conditions. There are many space-
related taxonomy studies for space mission assurance in the open literature. We follow the 
guidance in [35] since it sets the opportunity to analyse the conceptual framework sufficiently 
with the right number of classifications. 
This paper is developed around this taxonomy in which space mission assurance has 
three interrelated basic conceptual domains: 1. Defensive operations, 2. Reconstitution and 3. 
Resilience [35]. To address most of the threats against space (see Table-2) in space-dependent 
operations [4], widely known resilience domain shall be considered with the other two critical 
components of the space mission assurance, which are defensive operations and reconstitution, 
since they may also be very harmful to space systems. The defensive operations domain 
includes off-board protection methods while on-board protection methods are discussed in the 
resilience domains [35]. 
In this paper the following framework of methods and strategic vision is proposed for 
Turkey’s future resilient and robust SBA (see Table-1) to secure the safety in space. To supply 
the requirements of Turkey’s security and defence policy and to provide SBA’s safety, possible 
solutions are proposed for each domain sequentially.
5.1. Defensive operations are the self-protective actions that disrupt the attacker from 
harming space systems or offering forewarnings before their intention [35]. This capability 
requires awareness of the intentional or unintentional threats and needs manoeuvring of the 
SBA accordingly. For example, Turkey made its third collision avoidance manoeuvre on 27 April 
2016 to avoid to collision with space debris caused by China’s FENGYUN-1C DEB for its 
national reconnaissance satellite Göktürk-2  [44]. These coordinated and systematic 
manoeuvres of SBA by Turkish operators with the provided situational awareness warnings by 
itself or friendly capabilities are of primary importance for Turkey to operate SBA securely. On 
the other hand, on-board self space situational awareness, threat detection systems, restore 
capabilities and mitigation procedures including software capabilities after threats/hazards 
capabilities may be good defensive space operations for Turkey. Disaster recovery plans, 
interference mitigation plans, personnel security clearances, and Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) are other defensive operations that need to be ready and operational in space.
5.2. Reconstitution is “the plans or operations to bring new assets on line in order to 
replenish lost or diminished functions to an acceptable level for a particular mission, operation, 
or contingency after an attack or catastrophic event” [35]. 
Turkey initiated Göktürk-1, Göktürk-2 (now in-orbit) and Göktürk-3 LEO satellite projects 
for the Turkish Armed Forces’ (TAF) reconnaissance and surveillance requirements [17-20]. 
Turkey’s other important space program is the Regional Positioning and Timing System (RPTS) 
(known in Turkish as “Bölgesel Konumlama ve Zamanlama Sistemi-BKZS”) project to provide 
positioning and timing information to the TAF in the area of interest at all times [21]. On the 
other hand, the Türksat series Türksat 3A, Türksat 4A and Türksat 4B satellites are serving in 
their GEO orbits for communication purposes [25]. Additionally, the Türksat 6A satellite project 
including space and ground segments was signed on 15 December 2014 [23] and two more, 
Türksat 5A and 5B, satellite projects are currently being planned [46].  
For the reconstitution measures, Turkey may consider to launch new Türksat, Göktürk 
and RPTS satellites for back-up operational capability. Moreover, additional communication and 
C2 ground segments should be established for LEO (Göktürk), MEO (RPTS) and GEO (Türksat 
or milsatcom) satellites. More C2 ground segment is especially important for the LEO Göktürk 
satellites to benefit and maximize the naturally limited download times and to be able to send 
the mission orders to the satellite anytime. Deployable/transportable/mobile backbones and 
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ground stations may help reconstitution quickly. Though, Turkey has an Assembly, Integration 
and Test (AIT) centre for space systems, a second AIT may serve Turkey advantageously to be 
able to build more satellites simultaneously whenever needed. 
Enlarging the launch sites in Turkey’s Space Launch System Project will provide 
reconstruction and provide sustainability of the Turkish satellite roadmap independently [24]. On 
the other hand, both further guaranteed frequency bands allocated by the International 
Telecommunication Union/NATO and supplementary signals will boost Turkey’s capacity 
through extra links. Reconstitution domain is not sufficient by itself but it is complementary for 
defensive operation and resilience domains.   
5.3. USA DoD [47] defines the third domain which is Resilience as “the ability of an 
architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, 
shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and 
threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions”. There are many ways to address the 
known threats to space and make SBA more resilient. Although most of the threats and 
countermeasures are classified in the “protection” subtitle, there are five more different aspects 
of having resilient space assets. Resilience has six common sub-elements formulated as: 
Disaggregation, Distribution, Diversification, Deception, Protection and Proliferation (D4P2) [47]. 
These sub-elements are explained and their application methods are proposed for Turkey in the 
following parts of the paper.
 
5.3.1. Disaggregation of the space capability is to have different kinds of capabilities on distinct 
payloads or different satellites [35]. One way of dealing with the increasing threat to space is to 
separate the payloads and to differentiate the satellites according to the wideband/narrowband, 
protected/unprotected and core/extended operational necessities. The operational space 
requirements shall be classified into tactical, operational and strategic requirements. For 
strategic communications, protected satellites may be allocated. While protected core services 
for strategic communications may be provided through military satellites or military payloads 
[15], operational or tactical extended communications may co-exist with commercial Türksat 
satellites or hosted payloads on other allied or friendly satellites. For social satellite 
communication requirements, non-protected commercial Türksat satellites (Ku band) may 
continue to be used.   
Different frequency bands (X, Ku, Ka, military Ka, UHF and EHF) for different needs are 
example of disaggregation to productize Turkey’s space and SATCOM capabilities. Turkey may 
have separate EHF satellites [15] for its strategic protected wideband satcom needs. Separate 
UHF satellites [15] may be used for narrowband satcom requirements of tactical users. Different 
X band payload on different satellite may serve to operational level users. As a conclusion, it is 
wise to plan different X (7250-7750 MHz, 7900-8400 MHz), Ku (12-18 GHz), Ka (20.1-21.2 
GHz, 30-31 GHz), UHF (240-270 MHz, 290-320 MHz) and EHF (43.5-45.5 GHz) band 
capacities by disaggregating them on different payloads and on different satellites for Turkey, 
instead of having all bands on a single satellite.  
Turkey’s first internally designed high resolution LEO satellite, Göktürk-2, has an Electro-
Optical payload. On the other hand, Turkey is on the right path by initiating a different satellite to 
provide high-resolution images in any weather condition for a different requirement [20] by 
signing an additional Göktürk-3 Synthetic Aperture Radar satellite project for different strategic 
requirements. 
Turkey, as an emerging space country, will benefit from disaggregation of the space and 
satellite capability on different platforms in three ways: It will minimize the space system design 
complexity, alleviate and share the risks, and increase its space readiness. 
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5.3.2. Distribution is the design of the system operating as a centralized node of nodes which 
are performing together for the same mission [35]. RPTS is a good implementation example of 
SBA distribution for Turkey. To address the regional timing and navigation system requirement, 
the RPTS should be a distributed system. Distributed design of the RPTS project will prevent 
the single point of failure from being an issue, avoid being a single and an easy target to threats, 
and increase the survivability of the GNSS system. Another distribution way of Turkey’s space 
capability may be to have on-board X and Ku band cross-link designs to transition between 
different bands to extend the coverage area of each different band. Small satellite concept is 
another means of distribution of the space systems which may allow Turkey to reach space in a 
relatively cheap manner.  
5.3.3. Diversification is the concept of having the separate platforms/orbits/systems and/or using 
civilian, commercial or international partners’ space capacities for a particular mission [35]. Like 
other nations, X band space capacity is the core and an indispensable operational satellite 
communication requirement for Turkey. Turkey has X band capacities on different satellites [15]. 
Following X Band payloads should not only be on different satellites but also these satellites 
should be in alternative orbits. Additionally, for the X band requirement, civilian or commercial X 
band opportunities may be alternatives when the demand is unexpectedly increased. 
Alternatively, NATO, EU, NATO/EU members, and friendly or allied nations are other partner 
choices. Turkey can use their X band space capability wherever the operational need is not in 
the Türksat satellites’ coverage area.  
Inter-satellite Link Systems (ISL) is another diversification method for Turkey to consider 
to have links between LEO Göktürk satellites and GEO Türksat satellites to maximize the 
downlink and uplink capacity and extend the coverage areas.
Commercial satellite communications (comsatcom) instead of military satellite 
communications (milsatcom), hosted payloads and international partners are also other ways of 
diversification for further resilient space needs. Additional satellite communication requirements 
in Ku, Ka, military Ka, UHF, EHF bands and combination of them may be supplied in a similar 
way. As another MEO example, Glonass, GPS or Galileo space segments via international 
collaborations can be used for the PTN services with the RPTS project. On the other hand, 
other LEO satellites (of partners or commercial) can be alternative systems for Turkey’s ISR 
requirements to achieve the same mission goal. By diversifying the space capabilities on 
different satellites, in additional orbits or by different systems, Turkey will be able to use 
alternative means of risk sharing, cost reduction and greater collaboration in space.  
5.3.4. Deception is the action of misleading others about one’s real strengths and weakness in 
space capability [35].Turkey should have critical space technology including design, software, 
integration, testing and launch know-how. Adversaries will not be able to decide where the 
centre of gravity is and will hesitate to attack if they don’t know about the actual operational 
capacity. By building space capacity domestically, it will be easier not only to hide one’s design 
constraints, limitations, strengths or operational vulnerabilities but also to keep the intention and 
the operational capability secret. Deception will also decrease the possibility of being a target, 
provide strategic surprise on enemies [35], and increase the survivability. 
 
5.3.5. Proliferation is the act of enlarging the number of the same platforms, payloads or system 
capabilities for the unique mission [35]. L, C, Ku and Ka bands are the applications of 
commercial satellites while UHF, X, military Ka and EHF are generally the examples of military 
payloads for communication satellites. Military satellites serve protected or unprotected and 
narrowband or wideband communications.   
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Turkey has X and Ku band capacities [15] for the current satcom needs from Europe to 
Asia and North Africa [25]. Ku band is used for social needs generally and X band is mainly 
used for military communications by the TAF. However, the number of existing X and Ku band 
payloads may be increased for upcoming requirements especially after UAVs are operationally 
used. Since the space/satellite projects and their frequency coordination are long-running 
procedures and satellites take a long time to be build, expected and unexpected upcoming 
operational needs shall be considered at least seven years before launch.  
Additionally, more payloads and satellites to provide the communication requirements in 
Ka, military Ka, UHF and EHF bands may be planned for future needs or increased throughput. 
Similarly, increasing the number of RPTS/Göktürk satellites, the number of downlink of Göktürk 
satellites, and the number of ground facilities for space-based services will help Turkey to 
proliferate its space capability. Additional national and international infrastructures will extend 
the communication links which will intensify the real-time communication and information 
sharing. The number of each similar LEO, MEO, and GEO satellites will increase as a result of 
the proliferation, thus the availability and the reliability of Turkey’s space systems will be 
boosted.    
Sub-system or equipment level redundancy and payload level redundancy also provides 
and furnishes Turkey’s space proliferation. On the other hand, improving the TAF’s TAFICS 
(Turkish Armed Forces Integrated Communications System) [15] terrestrial fibre optic link, 
Radio Link systems and linking hot/cold redundant ground control stations via the TAFICS 
network will satisfy proliferation and enhance the resilience.    
5.3.6. Protection is the active and passive actions taken to continue to perform the mission 24/7 
in all situations [35] including harsh conditions. Since, satellites generally serve at least seven 
(LEO satellites) to fifteen (GEO satellites) years in their orbits, Turkey should take space threats 
into considerations starting from their initial plan, and design them accordingly. Because, there 
will be no chance to change the in-orbit spacecraft’s design during their life time after launch.  
The protection methods which may be taken into consideration by Turkey especially for 
military/defence space projects are listed below. These methods include but are not limited to 
the following [2], [30],[33–35]:
• Anti-Jamming techniques including Antenna Nulling and Spread Spectrum
• Spread spectrum includes direct sequence and frequency hopping methods, and 
CDMA (for fading, jammers, spoofing, interception, cyber and nuclear attacks)




• Limited coverage area instead of global coverage area (for some cases)
• Digitally programmable (software defined) satellites
• Scrambling and interleaving for low probability interception
• Dynamic rate management
• Adaptive coding
• Spontaneous adaptation methods to the stress
• On board processing for electronic attacks to satellites, interception, cyber and 
nuclear attacks
• Hosted internal decoys
• Nuclear hardening
• RF Limiter
• On demand manoeuvring capability of the satellites 
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• Inter-satellite links to mitigate physical attacks to satellites, interception, detection 
and cyber-attacks
• Red and black distinction architecture
• National encryption (including telemetry, telecommand and space originated data)
• Authentication and identification of users against spoofing, adversary access, and 
interruptions to both space and ground segments.
For the common jamming conditions, using frequency hopping modems and hardened 
CDMA can be good applications for the mitigation of space threats. Turkey has produced its 
own NATO STANAG 4606 Ed.1 compatible frequency hopping modems [48]. In the presence of 
HANE, the use of EHF band may be necessary [2]. Turkey is the second NATO nation, after 
USA, who produced a processed EHF engineering model domestically [14,15] for this purpose. 
Turkey should extend this capability and have in-orbit processed EHF band for secure 
milsatcom need.
As a conclusion, the SBA shield requires more redundant and resilient hardware and 
software. Its protection will enable Turkey to continue to undertake its operations and duties 
continuously, securely, anytime, and anywhere in a reliable way. Thus, in the event of any 
threats, attacks or hazards Turkey will be able to restore its space systems immediately at the 
aftermath of threats or hazards. Moreover, it will increase self-awareness and robustness in 
space for Turkey. It is clear that protection against all possible threats adds considerable costs 
and may not be affordable [49], hence Turkey should also decide the appropriate degree of 
protection for different levels of user. 
Disregarding and ignoring the threats against space missions may result in the loss of 
critical space/ground resources or unauthorized destruction of C4ISR systems. As a result, 
threats may affect the mission success and may make the entire mission impossible. All threats 
attempt to injure either the physical part of the space system or the communication link between 
the space and ground segment. Space mission planners should use aforementioned 
technologically available solutions whenever appropriate, carry out risk assessments and have 
a close coordination with the security experts.
SBA provide incomparable opportunities for the security and defence strategies with 
emerging technologies. Many space and satellite projects involve foreign players. To address 
requirements in Turkey’s security and defence policies, a new more space oriented approach 
should be considered. 
Today’s complex and changing needs of security and defence requirements call for 
technology aided and driven methods to overcome the threats in time. SBA will provide better, 
deeper and all time security and defence. It seems that they will be widely used in the future too. 
The security in space issues influence international relations and the new global security 
thinking. Though it naturally has regional issues and differences, it unmistakably calls for 
international collaborations.
Being aware of other operational satellites, their capabilities and space debris are also 
important factors for the efficient use of satellites and space for security and defence purposes 
safely and efficiently, and in a sustainable way. 
6. Result and Discussion
Space is a valuable means to Turkey for its security and defence needs.  Satellites 
provide a major contribution to the security and defence sector with their advantages of flexible, 
cheaper, resilient and global coverage service capability. As the use of satellites and their 
capabilities continues to increase, they are also being intentionally targeted more than ever 
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before [40–44]. Not only the man-made threats but also space debris are increasingly becoming 
potential threats against satellites. 
It is clear that both the demands and the threats for satellites and space programs are 
continuously increasing [40–44]. The most affected orbit is LEO since the debris are 
continuously getting worse and congested in this orbit. A single protection architecture will not 
be enough for all threats and hazards. Hence, international collaborations in space may provide 
better security in space for Turkey. 
As space and security becomes increasingly global, threats force nations to cooperate 
more with each other. The EU and its strategically important partner, Turkey, should seek to 
meet the new security challenges and requirements together by a new security dimension 
coming from space, wherever possible, in an international collaboration. International/regional 
space cooperation and partnerships will address the vulnerabilities of the SBA and sustainability 
of the secure space utilization. 
Satellites are game changers and they are needed for more rapid, more swift, more 
intelligent, more effective and more precise decisions and actions. Peacekeeping and 
humanitarian operations are all around the world. These operations need secure BLOS 
communication, more resilient space segments and better situational awareness for information 
integrity and superiority. The satellite is at the heart of the information integrity and superiority 
and the key to strategic plans, sovereignty and autonomy. Satellites need to be robust in harsh 
and Electronic Warfare (EW) environments. Hence, nuclear protection for satellites is urgently 
called for the fragile and uncertain future battlefield and operational AOR. Protected space and 
secured communication links are of great importance for successful operations.  
Security and defence take the advantages of uniqueness of SBA, especially feature of 
wide coverage and near-real-time communications. Besides the aforementioned applications, 
numerous other security and defence requirements can extensively be met by the intrinsic 
achievements of space originated data. Global coverage, interoperability, robustness, cost 
efficiency, flexibility, multicast and broadcast communications, near-real-time communications, 
place and terrestrial infrastructure independence, reliability, high resolution images, quick 
connectivity, higher bandwidth, BLOS command and control of UAVs, minimized operation 
costs, rapid deployment of the ground systems and usability in hazardous as well as hostile 
environments are the main benefits of SBA. This paper has shown that these unique capabilities 
make satellites an indispensable tool for all nations’ SDP including both Turkey’s and EU’s, but 
they are also vulnerable to space threats.
To defend against terrorism is one of the main legal duties of national security and 
defence authorities. Terrorism is not new and happens globally. In the year of 2016, there were 
many shocking attacks all around the world. Terrorists achieve their goals, worldwide deep fear 
by attracting the awareness of the media, by the help of the broadcast media who can serve 
and convey these kind of event news as they happen in real-time worldwide simultaneously via 
the use of technology often through the global coverage capabilities of satellite communications. 
Until more serious steps including technological perspectives are considered, the terrorist 
threats may not end, and they may occur again at anytime and anywhere including in space. 
Hence, secured space needs to be considered to ensure that security is secured.
Space assets are also key for modern communication and warfare. SBA are subject to 
the aforementioned man-made threats. Additionally, the natural environment of space is itself a 
hazard for satellites. SBA are becoming increasingly vulnerable to these hazards and threats. 
Changing requirements, diversified threats and growing hazards require new types of affordable 
secure approaches to match defence and security requirements and clearly without a doubt 
need additional countermeasures. As a result, one of the most important infrastructures, 
satellites, should be better protected for defence and governmental users. However, 
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consideration should be given to the emerging threats for all SBA and also to designing and 
using them accordingly. 
Turkey should consider the aforementioned three-interdependent cross domain abilities 
at the conceptual level to secure its safety in the space-related architecture, design and 
evaluation processes which are essential to become a regional space power. 
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